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UNCLAIMING AND REBLAMING: MEDICAID WORK
REQUIREMENTS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF HEALTH
CARE ACCESS FOR THE WORKING POOR
JULIE NOVKOV ∗
This Essay will look at the imposition of Medicaid work requirements
in states that expanded access to Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act
(“ACA” or “the Act”). 1 Poverty policy scholars have roundly criticized this
development, which began in 2018 after the Trump Administration indicated
its interest in receiving proposals for new programs. This policy development underlines and links several long-standing themes: Access to affordable
health care is a privilege rather than a right; the poor can and should be divided into deserving and undeserving categories; benefits provided to the
poor need to be policed strictly to prevent fraud; and able-bodied adults
should not be given any kind of support or benefit unless they are working
for wages or actively seeking wage labor.
But of equal importance, and inextricably intertwined with the policy
change, is the implementation of work requirements through the use of automated systems. This Essay will argue that understanding the shift to automation contributes to a stronger critique of work requirements. As an integral
part of work requirements, automation reverses the conventional structural
process of naming, blaming, and claiming while simultaneously creating injuries. 2 Automated systems remove human agents from decisionmaking, reconfiguring law’s violence in ways that sublimate and mask state actors’ intent by shattering it into numerous individual pieces that cannot be tied to
cognizable wrongdoers. 3 Procedural due process becomes completely attenuated, utterly detached from what is happening to people. The victims of
these failures, as the only visible agents remaining, are left to carry the blame,
and breakdowns and problems become an anticipated and expected part of
the process.
© 2019 Julie Novkov.
∗ Professor, Departments of Political Science and Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies,
University at Albany, SUNY. The author thanks the participants at the 2019 Maryland Conference
on Constitutional Law, as well as Virginia Eubanks, Patricia Strach, and Esra Gules-Guctas, who
have inspired her with their passionate and informed consideration of digitization and policy reform.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001–18122 (2012).
2. See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631, 631–654 (1980–81).
3. As Professor Robert Cover has explained, law is a form of state power and inherently incorporates violence. Administrative decisions as well as judicial decisions generate coercion and
pain for their subjects. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
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The stakes for grappling with these problems are high. Working poor
adults are the canaries in the coal mine not just for policy failures, but for
failures of justice. Compounding these failures stands to work continued injustice that carries down from generation to generation. And the failures will
further pathologize poverty and those who must turn to Medicaid to address
their medical needs.
This Essay will proceed by providing some background on the rise of
automation to administer government benefit programs and then explain the
adoption of the ACA and the shift in the types of waivers solicited by the
Trump Administration, using Kentucky’s story as an example. It then will
analyze the implementation of waivers in Arkansas, detailing the problems
Medicaid recipients and program administrators faced. The Essay then will
address a series of lawsuits filed to challenge work requirements, noting that
they have primarily focused on administrative interpretations of congressional intent. The Essay then will use the foregoing analysis to illustrate how
the current framings of these challenges struggle to identify and acknowledge
injuries wrought by automated systems. The Essay will close by suggesting
that legal analysts develop new models to identify digital wrongs and enable
corrective action.
A. A Little Background on Automation and Poverty
Since the early 1970s, both the federal government and the states have
increasingly relied upon computers and metrics to contain public spending
with respect to welfare. 4 Professor Virginia Eubanks describes the potent
developmental process that produced the current environment. The public
interest litigation and the activism of the National Welfare Rights Organization expanded welfare to incorporate black and brown recipients through the
late 1960s and into the early 1970s. Opponents of Aid to Families with Dependent Children’s (“AFDC”) 5 expansion relied on racial stereotyping to revive stigma against the poor, incorporating claims of fraud and waste in a
toxic brew. 6 In the wake of Goldberg v. Kelly7 and other rulings from the
late Warren Court emphasizing procedural due process, state actors sought
neutral, nondiscretionary means of managing and distributing benefits, relying increasingly on automated systems. These systems, which Professor Eu-

4. VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY : HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE,
POLICE, AND PUNISH THE P OOR 33 (2017).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–44 (1994). AFDC was the precursor to the current benefits system for
poor families.
6. EUBANKS, supra note 4, at 32–33.
7. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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banks characterizes as “digital poorhouse[s],” eliminated discretion but effectively shrank public spending “by increasing scrutiny and surveillance of
welfare recipients.” 8
The shift from AFDC to Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(“TANF”) 9 exacerbated these problems. 10 If AFDC was only precariously
situated as an entitlement, TANF was designed to undercut any such expectations. The new system imposes lifetime eligibility limits and work requirements, restricts the use of benefits to support time spent pursuing higher education, and implements sanctions for noncompliance, including
noncompliance with information-gathering initiatives. 11 Tracking, managing, and imposing these sanctions relies upon automated and algorithmic systems, facilitating and enhancing “moralistic and punitive poverty management strategies” while simultaneously removing individual agency and
accountability for decisions. 12 The digital dream—"high-tech tools that
promise to help more people, more humanely, while promoting efficiency,
identifying fraud, and containing costs”—repeatedly transforms into a nightmare. 13 While the tools themselves may be new, as Professor Eubanks explains, they operate within a deeply rooted framework designed to discipline
the poor and maintain distinctions between deserving and undeserving poor
people.
Professor Eubanks’ work shows the complete disregard for the real human consequences of sloppy technological design and rushed implementation in her discussion of automating welfare eligibility processes in Indiana. 14
In 2006, Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels aggressively promoted an overhaul
of the state’s welfare system to streamline the application process, identify
and punish fraud, and privatize casework. 15 The State selected a private coalition of companies led by IBM to engineer the transformation. 16 Despite
problems and failures in pilot programs, Indiana pressed forward with automation, producing horrific snarls of virtual paperwork and rampant errors.
One Medicaid attorney in Bloomington estimated that ninety-five percent of
applications submitted through the automated system produced eligibility errors. 17 Clients were denied and electronically removed from the system for

8. EUBANKS, supra note 4, at 33.
9. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2110 (codified as amended primarily in scattered sections of titles 7 and
42 of the United States Code).
10. See EUBANKS, supra note 4, at 36–37.
11. Id. at 36.
12. Id. at 37.
13. Id. at 38.
14. Id. at 39–54.
15. Id. at 45.
16. Id. at 48.
17. Id. at 53.
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failure to cooperate without being informed what specifically was wrong in
their complicated applications for assistance. Caseworkers’ jobs shifted radically from handling cases with which they were familiar to an entirely fragmented process that made them “slaves to the task system.” 18
B. Adoption of the Affordable Care Act and the Shift in the Waiver
Program
The adoption of the ACA produced the greatest changes in the American
health care and health insurance system since at least the 1960s. While most
attention has focused on the debate over the ACA itself and Republican efforts to repeal it, the Act incorporates a great deal of room for quieter innovations that are taking place on the state level. 19 For instance, the Act created
the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation (“CMMI”), which encourages the development of “payment and delivery models that, ideally, will improve health outcomes while controlling costs.” 20 States wishing to engage
in reforms can seek funding to design and implement State Innovation Models (“SIMs”) that state-level designers hope will be effective and applicable
outside of the states that pilot them. 21 While national policymakers intended
this shift to emphasize pragmatic, flexible, evidence-based experimentation,
it has produced results heavily beholden to the political contexts and coalitions in states that have volunteered to participate. 22
Other forms of flexibility and innovation under the ACA are even more
problematic. Under Medicaid generally and prior to the passage of the ACA,
Congress had put into place a waiver process to allow “experimental, pilot,
or demonstration projects in welfare and Medicaid.” 23 The waiver process,
contained in section 1115 of the original legislation, began initially as a
means of solving minor implementation wrinkles, but has grown steadily
since then. By 2017, ten states were allocating three quarters or more of their
Medicaid spending through programs for which they had obtained waivers. 24
Several of these waivers, adopted prior to the 2016 election, allowed states
to expand their Medicaid coverage beyond the new flexibility provided under

18. Id. at 63.
19. Philip Rocco, Andrew S. Kelly & Ann C. Keller, Politics at the Cutting Edge: Intergovernmental Policy Innovation in the Affordable Care Act, 48 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 425, 426
(2018).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 448.
23. Carol S. Weissert & Matthew J. Uttermark, Glass Half Full: Decentralization in Health
Policy, 49 ST. & LOC. GOV ’T REV. 199, 207 (2017).
24. Id. at 208.
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the ACA, providing assistance with health care premium payments. Others
adopted incentives to reward healthy behavior. 25
While these early ACA waivers reflected state-level political struggles,
the Trump Administration additionally politicized the program by encouraging states to use section 1115 waivers for a new purpose. In 2017, Secretary
of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), Tom Price, and the Administrator
of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”), Seema Verma,
sent a formal letter to state governors “ushering in a new era for the federal
and state Medicaid partnership where states have more freedom”—the freedom being permission to reconfigure Medicaid to require employment, impose premiums, penalize emergency room usage, and otherwise constrict
coverage. 26 Several states responded eagerly, imposing work requirements,
time limits, drug tests, required premiums, and other changes reflecting not
only a desire to cut costs, but also to impose a particular vision of the state’s
responsibility to discipline the undeserving poor. 27
Kentucky was one of the first states to submit a request for a waiver in
response to this invitation and was the first to receive approval. 28 Kentucky
had expanded Medicaid under the ACA and was widely trumpeted as a success story, having produced one of the largest drops in the rate of uninsured
residents in the country, from sixteen percent in 2013 to eight percent in
2014. 29 This drop in the uninsured rate was accompanied by increased use
of outpatient services and preventative care, “reductions in emergency room
use, and improved self-reported health.” 30 Despite these outcomes, Kentucky’s new governor, Matt Bevin, elected late in 2015 after campaigning
against the new system, moved forward to dismantle Kentucky’s lauded
state-based exchange and shift the state to the federal health care exchange. 31
The new Governor proposed drastically altering the earlier waiver that had
expanded Medicaid coverage. He advocated for replacing it with a new
waiver program, Kentucky Helping to Engage and Achieve Long Term

25. MARY BETH MUSUMECI & ROBIN RUDOWITZ, KAISER COMM ’N ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, THE ACA AND MEDICAID EXPANSION WAIVERS (2015), http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-the-aca-and-medicaid-expansion-waivers.
26. Weissert & Uttermark, supra note 23, at 208–09 (quoting Letter from Thomas E. Price,
Sec’y, and Seema Verma, Ctrs. Medicare & Medicaid Servs. Adm’r, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., to all U.S. Governors, https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/sec-price-admin-vermaltr.pdf).
27. Id. at 209.
28. Keahna Akins, Prospective Policy Analysis of the Kentucky HEALTH Demonstration
Waiver 1, 10 (Nov. 5, 2018) (unpublished M.P.H. Capstone Project, University of Kentucky),
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1213&context=cph_etds.
29. Id. at 1.
30. Id. at 2.
31. Id.
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Health (“Kentucky HEALTH”) under section 1115. HHS approved the proposal in January 2018 with a scheduled implementation of July 1, 2018. 32
Kentucky HEALTH fundamentally changed the earlier waiver program
that had increased benefits under the ACA. For Kentuckians covered by
Medicaid expansion, it eliminated dental and vision coverage and coverage
for nonemergency transport, added an annual deductible, added an incentive
account that rewarded enrollees for participating in “wellness” programs, disenrolled certain beneficiaries for delinquent payment of premiums, and required all “able-bodied” adults to participate in “work activities.” 33 Two
weeks after the waiver was approved, the National Health Law Program, the
Kentucky Equal Justice Center, and the Southern Poverty Law Center collaborated in filing a class action lawsuit on behalf of sixteen Kentucky residents who would be affected by the new program, seeking to block both the
implementation of the waiver program and any imposition of work requirements. 34
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia relied on
the Administrative Procedure Act 35 to find that the waiver granted to implement Kentucky HEALTH was inappropriate. 36 In the court’s understanding,
the new program failed because it did not promote the core objectives of
Medicaid, a key threshold for any program requiring a waiver. 37 While the
court embraced a deferential standard of review, it agreed with the plaintiffs
that the central purpose of Medicaid is “to provide coverage and care to the
most vulnerable” and, moreover, “to provide that care generally free of
charge.” 38 The court relied both on Medicaid’s original authorization and the
2010 expansion under ACA to reach this conclusion, and found that the Secretary, in granting the waiver, had failed to ask two critical questions:
Whether the new program “would cause recipients to lose coverage,” and
whether it would “help promote coverage.” 39 In the court’s comprehensive
factual analysis, which relied on expert health policy amici, the new program
would drastically slash the state’s Medicaid rolls and “reduce health coverage
for low-income individuals.” 40 The court also mentioned that the new administrative system would likely “increase ‘clerical and tracking errors and
delays,’ which in turn would ‘cause inadvertent terminations.’” 41
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id. at 4–5.
34. Id. at 5.
35. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–706 (2018).
36. Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d. 237, 272 (D.D.C. 2018) [hereinafter Stewart I] (referring
to the waiver approval as “arbitrary and capricious”).
37. Id. at 265.
38. Id. at 259–60.
39. Id. at 262.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 263.
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The possibility of lost coverage by design or through the implementation of new delivery systems was critical to the court because, as the opinion
emphasized, Congress’s purpose in providing health insurance was not to
promote health, but to make health care more affordable. 42 The court considered the meaning of expansion, finding that ACA’s expansion of Medicaid
to all individuals below prescribed income levels placed them on the same
footing as previously covered vulnerable populations. 43 The Secretary of
HHS’s reliance on tangential factors—improving health outcomes, lowering
costs, and fostering self-sufficiency—when determining if waiver was appropriate, supplanted focus on the primary goals of the program. 44 Thus, the
court concluded the approval of the waiver was arbitrary and capricious. 45
The court, therefore, prevented the program from going into effect. 46
This victory, significant as it was, had limits. Kentucky simply reapplied for the waiver. After receiving more than 11,500 comments, more than
8500 of which criticized the work requirement, CMMS again approved the
waiver. 47 Kentucky set things in motion to implement the program on April
1, 2019, but the same plaintiffs filed suit again, alleging that the Secretary of
HHS still failed to address the threat of mass loss of coverage. 48 To this
claim, they further alleged that Kentucky’s threat to end coverage for those
who had obtained it through Medicaid expansion produced additional statutory concerns. 49 In the end, despite the additional round of consideration, the
district court again found the program’s approval by the Secretary was improper because the Secretary did not show that the new program “promotes
the objectives of the Medicaid Act.”50
While the Secretary agreed that the central purpose of Medicaid was to
“furnish medical assistance to the populations covered by the Act,” including
those brought in under the ACA, he argued that the Medicaid Act had three
additional objectives: advancing health and wellness, “increas[ing] beneficiaries’ financial independence,” and “ensur[ing] the fiscal sustainability” of

42. Id. at 267.
43. Id. at 269.
44. Id. at 272.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 274. The State of Kentucky, dissatisfied with the legal challenge, filed its own lawsuit against the Stewart I plaintiffs, claiming that enjoining Kentucky HEALTH constituted a legally
cognizable injury because Kentucky would be forced to “un-expand” Medicaid. Bevin ex rel.
Kentucky v. Stewart, No. 3:18-cv-00008-GFVT, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140394, at *11 (E.D. Ky.
Aug. 20, 2018).
47. Darla Carter, Updated: Kentucky’s Medicaid Overhaul Approved, INSIDER LOUISVILLE
(Nov. 20, 2018, 7:57 PM), https://insiderlouisville.com/health/kentuckys-medicaid-overhaul-approved/.
48. Stewart v. Azar, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 131 (D.D.C. 2019) [hereinafter Stewart II].
49. Id. at 136.
50. Id. at 137.
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Medicaid generally. 51 The waiver, the Secretary claimed, was justified because the State had claimed that it advanced these objectives. The district
court disagreed with this analysis. While the Secretary provided some analysis of the Act’s core purpose of furnishing medical assistance, the court held
that the Secretary had not adequately analyzed the coverage question. The
real possibility, even under Kentucky’s conservative estimate, that 95,000
individuals would lose access to coverage did not receive enough consideration. 52 The court likewise rejected the Secretary’s contention that the promotion of health and financial self-sufficiency were purposes either of the legislation authorizing Medicaid or of the ACA. 53
The State also defended the reapproval of the waiver based on Kentucky
Governor Matt Bevin’s reaction to the first lawsuit, Stewart v. Azar54 (“Stewart I”). After the first waiver was invalidated, the Governor announced that
if the Kentucky HEALTH program, with its mechanisms for reducing Medicaid use, did not go into effect, he would use his executive authority to roll
back Kentucky’s participation in Medicaid expansion. 55 The Secretary used
this pronouncement to support his own original argument that financial sustainability for the State was a relevant consideration. If Kentucky opted to
terminate expansion because of cost, the Secretary reasoned, Kentuckians
would be worse off than if the demonstration waiver were approved, even
though the waiver had cost-control provisions incorporated. 56 But the court
rejected this line of reasoning, finding that a threat to de-expand Medicaid
could not be used to circumvent the usual analysis of whether the government
had appropriately taken into account the core purposes of Medicaid in approving or denying a waiver application. 57
Since the Kentucky litigation began, HHS has approved section 1115
waivers for demonstration programs imposing work requirements in several
other states. Five states—Arizona, Michigan, Ohio, Utah, and Wisconsin—
have not yet implemented these programs. 58 Nineteen other states have applications pending. 59 Thus far, only Arkansas and Indiana have implemented
their requirements, though, as discussed below, Arkansas’s implementation

51. Id. at 139 (emphasis omitted).
52. Id. at 140.
53. Id. at 143–48.
54. 313 F. Supp. 3d 237 (D.D.C. 2018).
55. Darla Carter, Oral Arguments Scheduled in Lawsuit Challenging Kentucky’s Medicaid
Overhaul, INSIDER LOUISVILLE (Feb. 20, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://insiderlouisville.com/health/oralarguments-scheduled-in-lawsuit-challenging-kentuckys-medicaid-overhaul/.
56. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 140.
57. Id. at 154.
58. Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 1115 Waivers by State, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-waiver-trackerapproved-and-pending-section-1115-waivers-by-state/.
59. Id.
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has been put on hold. 60 Indiana’s work requirement went into effect in 2019,
but the program does not require hours in the first six months. 61 Individuals
receiving Medicaid in Indiana will have to demonstrate five hours per week
beginning in months seven through nine of the program, with increases to
follow. 62 Arkansas, however, put its work requirements into place, drawing
intense national scrutiny—as well as criticism and more litigation, ultimately
resulting in an injunction stalling implementation. 63
C. Arkansas as a Digital Implementation Laboratory
A prospective analysis published by the Urban Institute in May 2018
gave a fairly clear picture of what to expect when the Arkansas waiver program, Arkansas Works, was implemented. 64 The Arkansas Works program
required most able-bodied adults to work eighty hours per month or engage
in other qualifying activities in order to be eligible for Medicaid coverage. 65
The Urban Institute’s study used Arkansas’s demographic information and
survey data collected from Medicaid enrollees to identify anticipated problems for enrollees who would likely be subject to the work requirement but
were not employed. 66 The study estimated an enrollment rate of approximately 269,000 non-disabled working age individuals in the state, with seventy-four percent likely to be exempt from work requirements, twelve percent subject to the requirements but already employed, and the remaining
fifteen percent (approximately 39,000 people) potentially nonexempt but not
working. 67
Despite concerns about the new system, its phased rollout began on June
5, 2018. 68 The new system required significantly more information about
Medicaid recipients than Arkansas had previously required to determine their
appropriate categorization. The Arkansas Department of Human Services
informed enrollees about upcoming changes, alerting them that “[s]ome people . . . have to participate in work activities to keep their health insurance
coverage. Those people will have to report work activities to DHS. . . . DHS

60. Id.
61. Id. at n.5 (“While Indiana began implementation of the work requirement in 2019, no hours
are required in the first [six] months.”).
62. Id.
63. Id. at n.4.
64. ANUJ GANGOPADHYAYA ET AL., URBAN INST., MEDICAID WORK REQUIREMENTS IN
ARKANSAS: WHO COULD BE AFFECTED, AND WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THEM? (2018),
https://www.urban.org/research/publication/medicaid-work-requirements-arkansas/view/full_report.
65. Id. at 5.
66. Id. at 7.
67. Id. at 3.
68. Louise Norris, Arkansas and the ACA’s Medicaid Expansion, HEALTHINSURANCE. ORG
(Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.healthinsurance.org/arkansas-medicaid.
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decides if you have to report work activities. DHS needs some information
from you to decide that.” 69 New Medicaid applicants under the waiver system were required to answer a battery of questions designed to determine
whether they fell into one of the exemption categories. 70
The Urban Institute’s pre-implementation study identified potential barriers to fulfilling the reporting requirements, including not having internet
access in the household, not having access to a vehicle, having less than a
high school education, and either having or living with “a household member
with a serious health limitation.” 71 Even the group likely to experience the
least difficulty with the reporting requirements—those who were potentially
nonexempt but holding down a job successfully—faced barriers, with fiftyfour percent having at least one of these situations. 72 Of the individuals not
employed but likely to be required to work, nearly a third had no internet
access at home, and seventy-eight percent of them experienced one or more
of the identified barriers. 73
The Urban Institute had correctly predicted that nonexempt individuals
who were not employed were likely to have difficulty “comply[ing] with the
state’s new work requirements, especially if the state does not make new investments in job training, job search assistance, employment supports, and
related services (which cannot be financed by Medicaid).” 74 More ominously, even individuals exempt from the new requirements and those meeting them were likely to have problems, because they “have characteristics
that may make it difficult for them to navigate the administrative processes
established to enforce work requirements, thus putting them at risk of losing
or failing to obtain Medicaid coverage even if [they are eligible] . . . possibly
leading to coverage losses among people that the waiver is not intended to
affect.” 75 Of course, these projections would have been no surprise to anyone
aware of Indiana’s experience with automating welfare reform in 2006, discussed in the introduction to this essay. 76
As in Indiana, neither concerns about the drastic nature of the changes
proposed in Arkansas nor about the logistics of implementing automated reporting in Arkansas gave pause to implementation. Arkansas put Arkansas
Works into place with the hope that it would prove an efficient and effective
69. GANGOPADHYAYA ET AL., supra note 64, at 4–5 (quoting DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS.,
WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE WORK REQUIREMENT 1, http://news.arkansasbluecross.com/docs/librariesprovider4/default-document-library/programflyer_aw.pdf?sfvrsn=5c076afd_0 (last accessed May 21, 2018)).
70. Id. at 9.
71. Id. at 4.
72. Id. at 18.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 23.
75. Id.
76. See notes 29–57 and accompanying text.
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means of providing access to services for the deserving, cut costs, and reduce
fraud. Advocates for the poor in Arkansas readily found nine plaintiffs to
challenge the program, eight of whom were enrolled in Medicaid, and one of
whom was disenrolled because he failed to comply with the work reporting
requirements. 77
The organized group of plaintiffs filed suit in November 2018. The suit
noted the technical problems as one argument against the work requirement,
but primarily challenged the Secretary’s exercise of discretion in granting the
waiver. While targeting Arkansas’s program specifically, the broad frame of
the suit alleged that the Trump Administration’s invitation of waiver proposals seeks “to bypass the legislative process and act unilaterally to fundamentally transform Medicaid.” 78 The plaintiffs characterized the implementation of the waiver program as “catastrophic,” having stripped more than
8400 individuals of access to health care in just a few months and placing
“thousands more” at risk. 79 While Arkansas had embraced Medicaid expansion under the ACA, the state had also initially requested a waiver at that time
to impose a work requirement, which was denied by the administrative leadership of HHS during the Obama Administration.
The suit alleged that under the ACA, once a state has elected to expand
Medicaid coverage, it may not treat enrollees differently, it is forbidden from
imposing additional eligibility requirements, and it must ensure that all eligible people who apply for coverage “are served and get coverage.” 80 Following the lead of the successful litigation in Kentucky, the suit challenged the
granting of the waiver on the ground that the Secretary’s authority to grant
waivers only extends to states that will promote the objectives of the Medicaid Act (as amended by the ACA). 81 The lawsuit characterized the Secretary’s solicitation of new proposals, the CMS Administrator’s issuance of
waivers, and the Arkansas government’s characterization of the program’s
goals as a “fundamental[] transform[ation]” of Medicaid. 82 Transformation,
however, is a legislative power, not one that the executive branch can exercise administratively under cover of executing the laws faithfully. 83 The
plaintiffs argued that the purposes of Medicaid and the ACA—to ensure access to coverage—were completely subverted by the waiver program, which
rendered coverage much more difficult to maintain for the expansion population.

77. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5–6, Gresham v. Azar,
363 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2019) (No. 1:18-cv-01900-JEB), 2018 WL 8265789.
78. Id. at 2.
79. Id. at 3.
80. Id. at 10.
81. Id. at 12–13.
82. Id. at 2.
83. Id. at 29.
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In the course of making the statutory and constitutional claims, the lawsuit alleged that the technological system developed to manage the waiver
program was itself part of the problem because of its role in making access
difficult. To contain costs, the work and community engagement requirement was limited to individual online reporting, even though the ACA required that individuals be permitted to submit information relating to eligibility in person, by telephone, or through the internet. 84 The system might
best be described as cumbersome; at worst, it seemed intentionally designed
to be obstructive. “To use the online portal, enrollees need[ed] an email address, a log-in and password unique to the portal, and a reference number
provided in a multi-page letter sent by DHS. Enrollees use[d] the reference
number to link their insurance account to the reporting portal.” 85 Once the
link between the enrollee’s insurance account and the portal was established,
it did not have to be reentered each month, but even after portal access was
secured, enrollees had to navigate through multiple screens to report activities that establish compliance with the work requirements. 86 Furthermore,
the portal, which was available only between 7:00 AM and 9:00 PM, was
occasionally entirely inaccessible due to scheduled maintenance during these
hours. 87 The stakes for failing to master the system were high. Failure to
report work activities for a given month by the fifth date of the following
month excluded any unreported activities from counting toward compliance.
Enrollees were also expected to navigate the online portal to claim exemption from the work requirement. Here, too, the stakes were high for errors. Periodic review of exemption attestations and compliance reports “may
result in retroactive removal of months of exemption or compliance.” 88 If
these removals resulted in a finding that an enrollee had failed to comply for
three months, the enrollee’s insurance was canceled, and the case was referred for investigation for fraud and pursuit of repayment of benefits. Insurance cancellation also led to the exclusion of the cancelled individual from
the system for an entire year, even if there was no finding of fraud. 89
The plaintiffs all alleged experiences with navigating the system that
ranged from frustrating to Kafkaesque. Take Adrian McGonigal, a fortyyear-old resident of Pea Ridge, Arkansas, for example. 90 A Medicaid enrollee since 2014, diagnosed with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(“COPD”), Mr. McGonigal received notice in June 2018 that the new work

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 17, 20.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19–21.
Id. at 33.
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requirement would apply to him. He called DHS to report that he was employed at McDonald’s but was informed that only online reports were accepted. Because he did not own a computer or smartphone, he had no ready
access to the internet, and his lack of a driver’s license left him dependent on
public transportation to get to the nearest public library to complete the report. With assistance from his family, Mr. McGonigal was able to report his
work hours in June 2018. 91 Relieved, he believed he had completed the requirement, and did not understand that he had to keep reporting. 92
In August 2018, he also got a new job with Southwest Poultry. 93 He
was initially assigned to work in the chicken processing department but found
that the chemicals in his new work environment aggravated his COPD. The
company moved him to the shipping department and his condition improved,
enabling him to work between thirty and forty hours per week. 94 However,
when he went to the pharmacy on October 5 to fill a prescription for his
COPD, he discovered that his coverage had been terminated. Unable to pay
the $800 cost, he left without his medication. 95
Mr. McGonigal then entered into a round of frustrating communications
to try to understand what had happened. 96 He called DHS, which referred
him to his insurance company. In return, his insurance company referred him
back to DHS. After securing representation from Legal Aid, he learned on
October 19 that his coverage had been terminated for failure to report his
work hours and he would not be eligible to resume coverage until the next
calendar year. 97 Only when he protested that he had indeed reported his employment and cited the letter he had received in June acknowledging his report did he learn that his coverage had been canceled for failing to report his
work hours every month. Ultimately, a DHS administrator granted him a
good cause exemption on October 31, 2018, despite the fact that neither his
lack of a permanent address nor his poor health, cited as reasons, were valid
extenuating circumstances according to DHS policy. 98
Unfortunately for Mr. McGonigal, while he was struggling to get his
coverage restored, he could not afford the medications that controlled his
COPD. After a trip to the emergency room, he missed several days of work,
recovering at home because the hospital would not keep him as an uninsured
patient. On October 22, citing his absenteeism, Southwest Poultry fired

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 34–35.
Id. at 35.
Id.
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him. 99 At the time of the filing, he was unemployed; the filing described him
as “unsure how he will keep his coverage given that he no longer has a job
and does not know how he will be able to meet the work or reporting requirements.” 100
Other plaintiffs had unique struggles with the waiver program, but common themes across their experiences were preexisting poor health, marginal
work records that, for many, intertwined with their health struggles, and difficulty in understanding and using the electronic system for reporting work
hours. 101 Of course, one can presume the plaintiffs were chosen as particularly poignant examples of the problems the waiver system created, and the
organizations that selected them sought individuals who had tried to comply
with the new requirements. Broader consideration of the program, however,
suggests that their experiences were not unusual either in their efforts to comply with both the work and reporting requirements or in their inability to do
so. 102
The State’s own records indicate that the program triggered significant
coverage losses for noncompliance. The new rules implemented in June
2018 mandated termination from Medicaid after three months of not meeting
the work and reporting requirements and enforced termination first against
individuals between thirty and forty-nine years old. 103 At the end of August,
the automated system flagged noncompliant individuals, and 4300 Arkansans
became the first Americans to lose Medicaid coverage for failing to report
sufficient work or work-related activities. 104 By the end of the year, more
than 18,000 adults had lost coverage. 105 Of the clients who did not meet the
work (or alternative) requirements in each month from June through December, almost all did so because they reported no work activities, suggesting
significant barriers to successful navigation of the automated system. 106

99. Id.
100. Id. at 36.
101. See id. at 30–48.
102. See infra notes 85–89 and accompanying text.
103. Joan Alker & Maggie Clark, One Month into Medicaid Work Requirement in Arkansas,
Warning Lights Are Already Flashing, GEO. U. HEALTH POL’Y INST. CTR. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES,
(July 20, 2018), https://ccf.georgetown.edu/2018/07/20/one-month-into-arkansas-medicaid-workrequirement-the-warning-lights-are-already-flashing/.
104. Jennifer Wagner, Over 4,300 Arkansas Beneficiaries Lost Medicaid This Month for Not
Meeting Rigid Work Requirements, CTR. ON BUDGET & P OL’Y PRIORITIES: OFF THE CHARTS (Sept.
13, 2018, 4:45 PM), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/over-4300-arkansas-beneficiaries-lost-medicaidthis-month-for-not-meeting-rigid-work.
105. Joan Alker, Arkansas’ Medicaid Work Reporting Rules Lead to Staggering Health Coverage Losses, GEO. U. HEALTH P OLICY INST. CTR. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES (Jan. 18, 2019),
https://ccf.georgetown.edu/2019/01/18/arkansas-staggering-health-coverage-losses-should-serveas-warning-to-other-states-considering-medicaid-work-reporting-requirement/.
106. ARK. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., ARKANSAS WORKS PROGRAM 6 (Dec. 2018), https://humanservices.arkansas.gov/images/uploads/011519_AWReport.pdf.
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A Kaiser Family Foundation analysis published in October 2018, which
reported the initial alarming drop in Medicaid recipients in Arkansas, attributed the drop to the state’s difficulties with informing people about the
changes and managing the system, both of which implicate technology. 107 In
discussing outreach efforts, the report presents a paradox, claiming that
“[d]espite a robust outreach campaign conducted by the state, health plans,
providers, and beneficiary advocates, many enrollees have not been successfully contacted.” 108 The State relied primarily on telephone calls to relay
information individually, but over half of enrollees did not have a telephone
number listed in the state’s database, many had incorrect listings, and many
who were reached did not respond to the calls or voicemails. 109 The State
partnered with a nonprofit organization, the Arkansas Foundation for Medical Care, to conduct outreach work, but the State’s requirements for contact
did not come close to covering all enrollees. For example, little effort was
made to conduct outreach in any language other than English. 110
As problematic as outreach was, the enrollment system was even more
of a barrier. The anticipated problems with creating an online account, which
required linking the online profile to a unique identifier number, materialized
rapidly. The online reporting requirement, unique to Arkansas, demanded
securing access through a fourteen-step process. 111 Users reported that the
portal design was not mobile-friendly, though many enrollees only had internet access through their cell phones. To overcome the barriers created by
lack of internet access and computer literacy, the waiver program allowed
“registered reporters” to allow enrollees “to designate a third party to create
their online accounts and access the portal to do their reporting.” 112 Health
plans and providers could designate staff to serve in this role, but few enrollees chose this option, and no funds were provided to educate either providers
or enrollees about how to use the portal. 113
The Kaiser Family Foundation analysis revealed that of the approximately 60,000 individuals who became subject to the new work requirements
in August, more than 16,000 did not report the minimum required eighty

107. MARY BETH MUSUMECI ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., AN EARLY LOOK AT
IMPLEMENTATION OF MEDICAID WORK REQUIREMENTS IN ARKANSAS 4 (Oct. 2018),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-An-Early-Look-at-Implementation-of-Medicaid-WorkRequirements-in-Arkansas; see also Wagner, supra note 104.
108. MUSUMECI ET AL., supra note 107.
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id. at 5.
111. Id. at 6.
112. Id. at 8.
113. Id. Designating a registered reporter would also imply waiving one’s privacy rights with
regard to information subject to reporting.
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hours of qualifying work activities. 114 The study could not definitively explain the reasons for these failures, but speculated that enrollees had difficulty
creating and linking their accounts or reporting their work hours through the
portal, concluding that “[n]on-compliance with the new requirements to date
is attributed to lack of knowledge about the complex new requirements.” 115
The system did better in identifying enrollees who were exempt from
the work reporting requirements, using data matching to verify that around
two-thirds fell into one of the exempt categories. Enrollees not identified,
though, had to report their justifications for exemption through the system.
As the Kaiser Family Foundation analysis noted, the system required
“[eleven] separate steps to report volunteer hours or to report an exemption
based on pregnancy.” 116 Here too, the complexity of the rules and the difficulty of navigating the portal took a significant toll. To add to the structural
problems, technical problems cropped up, including a statewide computer
outage on September 5, 2018, the deadline for reporting August hours, and
the first deadline with the potential penalty of cancellation of benefits. 117 In
addition to the system-wide failure:
Internet and cell phone connectivity, especially in rural areas, can
be slow and unreliable, which can translate to problems with reporting. One interviewee cited multiple examples of enrollees having difficulty linking their online accounts because the reference
number provided in the notice did not work or they did not receive
the notice with the reference number. 118
For those not automatically identified as exempt, the system placed the
burden on enrollees to determine their status, and the early experience of implementation revealed perplexing gaps. “Exemptions unlikely to be identified . . . include caring for an incapacitated person or experiencing a shortterm incapacity, pregnancy, participation in an alcohol or drug treatment program, and full-time students.” 119 The “medically frail” exemption was also
particularly challenging for individuals with mental health needs, and individuals with disabilities by and large were not seeking accommodations. 120
While the Kaiser Family Foundation analysis remarks that both research
and interviews support the idea that promoting work for enrollees is valuable,
it concludes that “the waiver design . . . tie[d] compliance to coverage, require[d] monthly online reporting and provide[d] no additional resources for

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 9–10.
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work supports,” producing unintended and largely negative consequences. 121
Even as early as September 2018, researchers could see that the State had
underestimated the complexity of implementing the changes, particularly the
transition to an entirely online system, and had failed to provide adequate
resources to manage either the transition or the operation of the new system.
While technology facilitated tracking things like efforts to reach out to enrollees and potential enrollees, electronic outreach was ineffective for enrollees
without stable addresses, phone numbers, or internet access. 122 These enrollees are by and large the most vulnerable and in need of assistance—and least
likely to hear about the changes or be able to navigate them successfully.
Early evidence shows that enrollees were indeed losing access to coverage, but not because they were resisting work requirements. Rather, they
were unable to navigate through the system effectively. 123 And while the
expressed goal was to encourage new employment, the early data shows that
most of the individuals meeting the work requirement were those who had
already been holding down jobs successfully prior to the implementation of
the waiver. 124 The automated withdrawal of coverage for individuals who
failed to meet or stopped meeting the work requirements appeared to create
coverage gaps that then generated uncompensated health care costs and
worse health outcomes. 125
But were these mere bumps in implementation? Even after the rollout,
as noted above, 126 individuals continued to fail to report their qualifying activities, ultimately losing coverage. For each month of operation in 2018, far
more people who did not meet the work reporting requirement reported no
activities than those who reported some activities.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
See, e.g., supra notes 101–106 and accompanying text.
MUSUMECI ET AL., supra note 108, at 14.
Id.
See, e.g., supra notes 114–120 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 1. ARKANSAS MONTHLY REPORTING RESULTS 2018 127
Reporting Period
(2018)

June
July
August
September
October
November
December

Clients not
Meeting Work
Reporting
Requirement
7464
12,722
16,357
16,757
12,128
8426
4776

Clients Reporting
No Activities

Clients Reporting
Some Activities

7392 (99.03%)
12,587 (98.94%)
16,132 (98.62%)
16,535 (98.68%)
11,966 (98.66%)
8308 (98.60%)
4703 (98.47%)

72
135
225
222
162
118
73

While Arkansas did not investigate the reasons for non-reports (individuals who reported no work activities), the rate of non-reporting did not pursue
the downward trend that one might expect for beneficiaries learning to navigate a functional reporting system. Whatever the new system was encouraging, it did not appear to be substantially increasing the number of people who
were managing to report some hours of work, even if not enough to fulfill the
requirements.
On March 25, 2019, the Kaiser Family Foundation published an additional report. The researchers found that 18,164 individuals lost coverage
during 2018, and only eleven percent had reapplied for and regained coverage
by the time the study was completed in March 2019. 128 When the program
began, only enrollees age thirty or older were subjected to the work requirement; as of January 2019, the requirement was expanded to include individuals between ages nineteen and twenty-nine. 129
When enrollees lost coverage for not working, the sanction was generally imposed against enrollees who reported no work activities over the
course of three months. 130 The failure to report any work at all suggests that
many of these enrollees were unable to create accounts within the system or
unable to navigate the reporting system with their accounts. The State, recognizing the large number of people removed by the automated system as a
problem, made additional efforts to raise awareness about the policy changes,
but the campaign could not penetrate into all of the communities with concentrations of potential enrollees. 131 The State did allow reporting hours by

127. ARK. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., supra note 106, at 6.
128. ROBIN RUDOWITZ ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FEBRUARY STATE DATA FOR
MEDICAID WORK REQUIREMENTS IN ARKANSAS 1 (Mar. 2019), http://files.kff.org/attachment/State-Data-for-Medicaid-Work-Requirements-in-Arkansas.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 3.
131. Id. at 4–5.
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phone, an option not available in the version of the program implemented in
the late spring of 2018. 132 Despite these efforts, the report found that as the
overall number of enrollees subject to the new work requirements increased
by seventy-three percent from December 2018 to January 2019 (going from
60,680 to 105,158), 133 the State’s data shows the percentage of enrollees reporting having satisfied the work requirement shrank. 134
D. Early Federal Court Responses: Administrative Procedure and
Congressional Intent
The Arkansas plaintiffs had some reason for optimism. As discussed in
Section B, Kentucky’s effort to implement similar requirements met a sharp
rebuff at the district court level in Stewart I in 2018. 135 In March 2019, separate rulings invalidated work requirements again in Kentucky in Stewart v.
Azar (“Stewart II”), 136 which had reapplied for its waiver after trying to cure
the problems noted in Stewart I, and in Arkansas in Gresham v. Azar. 137 The
same judge, Judge James Boasberg, elevated to the federal bench in 2011,
wrote lengthy opinions in both cases; 138 he also considered and resolved in
the same way a challenge to New Hampshire’s program in Philbrick v.
Azar. 139
The ruling in the Kentucky case, which thwarted Kentucky’s second attempt to implement its waiver, determined on technical grounds that Secretary Azar, in approving the waiver, had behaved in an arbitrary and capricious
manner. 140 While HHS was permitted to consider a waiver program’s positive impact on Medicaid’s fiscal sustainability, the federal agency could not

132. Id.
133. Id. at 2.
134. ARK. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., ARKANSAS WORKS PROGRAM 1 (Feb. 2019), https://humanservices.arkansas.gov/images/uploads/190315_February_AWReport.pdf. In December, of the
4776 Arkansans who did not meet the work requirement, 4703 reported no activities, and in January,
these numbers increased respectively to 10,258 individuals who did not meet the requirements and
10,117 failing to report. Id. at 6. More individuals reported Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (“SNAP”) compliance in January than in December, perhaps suggesting that some had
transitioned to the piggyback reporting rather than duplicating their reporting through a more complicated system. Id. at 4.
135. See supra notes 36–46 and accompanying text.
136. 366 F. Supp. 3d 125 (D.D.C. 2019).
137. Gresham v. Azar, 363 F. Supp. 3d. 165 (D.D.C. 2019)
138. Andy Schneider, Judge Blocks Arkansas and Kentucky Medicaid Work Requirement Waivers: What Does This Decision Mean for Other States?, GEO. U. HEALTH P OL’Y INST. CTR. FOR
CHILD. & FAMILIES (Mar. 28, 2019), https://ccf.georgetown.edu/2019/03/28/judge-blocks-arkansas-and-kentucky-medicaid-work-requirement-waivers/.
139. No. 19-733, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125675, at *1 (July 29, 2019).
140. Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 272 (D.D.C. 2018).
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lose sight of Medicaid’s primary goal, which Judge Boasberg defined as
“covering health costs.” 141
The Arkansas case worked in tandem with the Kentucky case. In Kentucky, the problem was one of federal administrative overreach that the
State’s efforts could not justify. Arkansas provided a further gloss on the
problem by giving the court the opportunity to consider a different program
with somewhat different justifications.
The implementation in Arkansas also afforded the court the opportunity
to consider the program as it operated, but Judge Boasberg’s analysis largely
turned on how Secretary Azar had proceeded to approval. 142 One significant
consideration about its operation was not substantive, but rather a question
of standing. Arkansas denied that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the
online reporting system because it had “changed its policy before this suit so
as to allow reporting by phone or in person.” 143 The court determined that it
did not have to grapple with this consideration because of the overall problems with the program, but Arkansas’s raising of the issue suggested that this
modification resolved a major implementation concern. 144
Judge Boasberg noted the same problems that provoked his ruling
against the Kentucky program. The Secretary, as he had with Kentucky’s
waiver, identified Medicaid’s objectives as assisting in “improving health
outcomes,” addressing “behavioral and social factors” related to health outcomes, and incentivizing “beneficiaries to engage in their own health care,”
failing to acknowledge that the overarching purpose of Medicaid is to fund
the provision of “medical services for the needy.” 145 This purpose, Judge
Boasberg explained, demanded that the Secretary conduct a far more searching analysis into claims by commentators that coverage losses would occur. 146
What, then, was required? While not prescribing specifics, Judge
Boasberg stated that, given the concrete and substantial warnings provided
by expert commentators, “the agency must grapple with the risk of coverage
loss.” 147 The Secretary was not free to rely on Arkansas’s failure to predict
losses, as the Secretary had an independent obligation to explain the rationale
for rejecting this concern. 148

141. Id. at 266 (citing Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 535 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).
142. Gresham, 363 F. Supp. 3d. at 175.
143. Id. at 174.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 176.
146. Id. at 177.
147. Id. at 178.
148. Id. The court further rejected the State’s attempts to justify the Arkansas waiver program
on the grounds that it served additional important purposes. Id. at 79.
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The State nonetheless attempted to maintain the program on the grounds
that interrupting it would be highly disruptive and confusing for program participants. 149 The court disagreed, ruling that even though Arkansas had already implemented its program, as with Kentucky, the appropriate solution
was to vacate the waiver, terminating the program. The court did not, however, entirely close the door for Arkansas, conceding that the State and HHS
could work together in the future to produce a program that would meet the
appropriate administrative standards. 150
New Hampshire’s waiver program, called “Granite Advantage”, which
features even stricter work requirements than those implemented in Arkansas, was approved by the HHS Secretary in November 2018, and the State
took the first steps toward implementation in early 2019.151 New Hampshire’s community engagement program, through which Medicaid recipients
must meet their work requirement, launched in March 2019 and became mandatory in June 2019. 152 Advocates wasted no time, filing a class action suit
on March 20 seeking an injunction against implementation of the program
and the mandatory removals from Medicaid coverage slated to begin in August. 153 Like Arkansas, New Hampshire did not estimate how many individuals were likely to lose health coverage through its work requirement. 154
The complaint against New Hampshire mirrors the successful strategy
established in Stewart I. It leads with a discussion of the policy changes the
waiver accomplishes and then discusses extensively statements by Trump
Administration officials indicating an interest in thwarting the ACA and redefining the purpose of Medicaid by soliciting the new round of waiver requests. 155 The plaintiffs further highlighted the Trump Administration’s
commitment to promoting work requirements as a transformational component for Medicaid in the proposed 2020 budget, which estimates that implementation across several states will save “$130 billion over ten years.” 156

149. Id. at 183. The court retorted somewhat acidly that the federal government and Arkansas
had expressed strong confidence in Arkansas’s capacity to communicate the work requirement
clearly to aid recipients. Id. at 184.
150. Id. at 183.
151. Louise Norris, New Hampshire and the ACA’s Medicaid Expansion,
HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.healthinsurance.org/new-hampshire-medicaid/.
152. Granite Advantage Community Engagement Requirements Announced, CONWAY DAILY
SUN (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.conwaydailysun.com/community/health/granite-advantage-community-engagement-requirements-announced/article_1e962caa-3527-11e9-b301e3e4917e8cc6.html.
153. Complaint at 2, Philbrick v. Azar, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125675 (D.D.C. July 29, 2019)
(No. 1:19-cv-00773-JEB).
154. Id. at 20. New Hampshire also eliminated a previously established form of retroactive
coverage, but likewise did not analyze the impact of this change. Id.
155. Id. at 25.
156. Id. at 31.
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The New Hampshire plaintiffs articulated a different set of reasons than
the Arkansas plaintiffs for struggling with the work requirements. New
Hampshire’s enrollees faced challenges not as much because of technical
problems but rather because of the substantive difficulties in their lives and
what counts and does not count as work. 157 One New Hampshire plaintiff,
Mrs. VLK, alleged that the reporting requirements would create problems for
her, citing challenges in completing forms and acquiring and uploading documentation, but these allegations do not discuss technology or automated termination as a distinctive problem. 158
Judge Boasberg again considered the arguments, describing the issues
in the case as “all too familiar.” 159 He noted that New Hampshire’s work
requirements mandated more monthly hours of work than enjoined programs
in Kentucky and Arkansas, and the New Hampshire program required work
from a broader age category than Arkansas Works. 160 The Secretary’s consideration of New Hampshire’s waiver failed to consider the ill effects of
implementation in Arkansas, and the agency’s responses to concerns were
“identical” to those the Court had rejected in its evaluation of Kentucky’s
program. 161 Despite the introductory discussion framing the dispute as
largely following the path of prior litigation, Judge Boasberg analyzed the
program and its justifications to support his conclusion that Secretary Azar’s
approval of Granite Advantage was arbitrary and capricious. 162 The Secretary relied largely on New Hampshire’s statements about its intention to support the Medicaid provision rather than grappling with the copious expert
evidence predicting coverage losses. As Judge Boasberg noted, “Similar intentions existed and corresponding protections were put in place in Kentucky,
but the Commonwealth projected a coverage loss equivalent to 95,000 people
losing Medicaid for one year. Same with Arkansas, yet it found that nearly
17,000 lost coverage at some point in the first six months alone.” 163
Neither the findings of negative outcomes nor the lawsuits have deterred
other states, however. By March 2019, the Secretary had approved work
requirement waiver requests in Indiana, Wisconsin, Michigan, Maine, Arizona, Ohio, and Utah in addition to the waivers discussed above. 164 Alabama,

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
Maine’s

Id. at 34.
Id. at 40.
Philbrick, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125675, at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *22.
Id. at *29.
Complaint, supra note 153, at 29. While Maine’s waiver was approved in late 2018, when
newly elected governor took office in 2019, she “informed CMS that the state would not

accept the terms of the waiver and would instead direct state officials to make vocational training and
workforce supports available to enrollees.” Id.
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Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia have applications pending with HHS. 165 West Virginia’s legislature
also took the first steps to add West Virginia to the list. 166 The court battle
over waivers will continue; Judge Boasberg’s narrow rulings leave room for
further reconfiguring of extant programs to try to nudge them toward legal
acceptability, and the states moving forward are likely to attend to this advice.
Recognizing the disruptive nature of this conflict, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the Trump Administration’s request for an expedited appeal of both Gresham and Stewart
II. The litigation should result in a ruling by the end of 2019. 167 That ruling
will likely identify the core question of whether the Trump Administration’s
advocacy for and approval of programs implementing work requirements violates the Administrative Procedure Act, perhaps with some broader questioning of what constitutes an illegitimate administrative change to a statutory
purpose. Legal commentators will watch these cases closely to see if they
might provoke Supreme Court interest down the road, as they raise important
questions about administrative law, particularly administrations’ capacity to
reconfigure legislative and previous administrative purposes.
As the litigation evolves and increasingly focuses on these questions,
however, it evades another important set of questions about what constitutes
injury and how injury can be identified. The plaintiffs in the cases lodge their
claims of injury against the administrative approval of these programs but do
so by objecting to the administrative understanding of the purposes of Medicaid. This set of claims, while important, obscures another type of injury
lodged in the programs themselves, addressed in the Section E.
E. Digital Management and Digital Injury
As the analysis above illustrates, the claims against Medicaid work requirements are intertwined with implementation problems (or prospective
concerns about what will happen when work requirements go into effect). At
first blush, these problems appear simply as a side effect of the reporting requirements themselves. Work requirements demand some form of verification, of course, and opponents of work requirements would argue that even

165. A Snapshot of State Proposals to Implement Medicaid Work Requirements Nationwide,
NAT’L ACAD. ST. HEALTH P OL’Y, https://nashp.org/state-proposals-for-medicaid-work-and-community-engagement-requirements/ (last updated Oct. 21, 2019).
166. Simon F. Haeder & Philip Rocco, Terrible Idea: Adding More Bureaucracy to Medicaid
Program, REG.-HERALD (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.register-herald.com/opinion/columns/terrible-idea-adding-more-bureaucracy-to-medicaid-program/article_b1cb24e4-fd1a-55e6-bdb9034dfb92f9cd.html.
167. Sara Rosenbaum, An Expedited Appeal for the 1115 Medicaid Work Experiment Cases,
HEALTH
AFF.
BLOG
(Apr.
26,
2019),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190425.862133/full/.
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if the system itself were relatively easy to navigate and did not create problems based on a perceived digital divide, the demand that people work itself
undermines the core purposes of Medicaid. As waiver programs have moved
forward, states have clearly been attending to HHS’s failure to defend Arkansas Works in court and the potential for such challenges. Maine’s work
requirement, while demanding more hours from Medicaid enrollees than Arkansas Works, gives them a variety of options for fulfilling the reporting requirement rather than insisting that it happen entirely online. 168 In Michigan,
while the primary means of administering the work requirement will be
through self-reporting via an online portal, the State has also developed an
expanded call center with automated reporting capability. 169 Other states, as
indicated in Table 2, have followed suit. But all rely on a reporting system
that penalizes enrollees for failing to log their hours through the designated
means. Furthermore, all provide mechanisms for automatic disenrollment of
individuals who do not meet the reporting requirements. 170

168. Granite Advantage, supra note 152.
169. MANATT, P HELPS, & P HILLIPS, LLP, POTENTIAL ENROLLMENT IMPACTS OF MICHIGAN’S
MEDICAID WORK REQUIREMENT 2 (2019), https://www.manatt.com/Manatt/media/Media/Images/White%20Papers/Manatt_MI-Work-Req-Estimates_20190206-Final.pdf.
170. A Snapshot of State Proposals, supra note 165.
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TABLE 2. APPROVED WAIVERS WITH WORK REQUIREMENTS
State

Date of
Implementation

Work
Requirement

Ky. 171

4/1/2019

80
hours/month

Ark.

6/5/2018

80
hours/month

6/1/2019

100
hours/month

Jan. 2019

1-6 months: no
requirement

172

N.H.
173

Ind. 174

7-9 months:
5 hours/week

Lockout
Provision

Reporting

Status

If annual
eligibility not
established,
locked out for
6 months.
If
noncompliant
for 3 months,
locked out for
remainder of
calendar year.
If
noncompliant
for 1 month,
locked out until
hours are
completed.
If
noncompliant
for 1 month,
locked out for
3 months.

Online, by
phone, or in
person

Enjoined

Online, by
phone, or in
person
(added after
implementation)
Online, by
phone, by
mail, or in
person

Enjoined

Online, by
phone, by
mail, or in
person

No
litigation
pending

Enjoined

10-12 months:
10 hours/week
13-18 months:
15 hours/week
18+ months:
20 hours/week

171. MaryBeth Musumeci et al., Re-Approval of Kentucky Medicaid Demonstration Waiver,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.kff.org/report-section/re-approval-of-kentucky-medicaid-demonstration-waiver-table/.
172. Norris, supra note 68; see also Gresham v. Azar, 365 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2019).
173. A Snapshot of State Proposals, supra note 165; Granite Advantage, supra note 152.
174. MARY BETH MUSUMECI ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., APPROVED CHANGES IN
INDIANA’S SECTION 1115 MEDICAID WAIVER EXTENSION (Feb. 2018), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Approved-Changes-in-Indianas-Section-1115-Medicaid-Waiver-Extension;
A
Snapshot of State Proposals, supra note 165.

170
Wis.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Fall 2019

175

Mich.

1/1/2020

176

80
hours/month
48-month
nonconsecutive
time limit
80
hours/month

Me. 177

Implementation
Cancelled

20 hours/week

Ariz.

1/1/2020

80
hours/month

178

[VOL. 79:145

If still on the
program after
48 months,
locked out for
6 months.

Not yet
promulgated

No
litigation
pending

If
noncompliant
for 3 months in
any 12-month
period, locked
out until
compliant for
at least 1
month.
If
noncompliant
for more than 3
months in a 36month period,
locked out.
If
noncompliant
for 1 month,
locked out for
2 months.

Not yet
promulgated

Questioned by
new
governor

NA

Withdrawn by
new
governor

Online, by
phone, or in
person

No
litigation
pending

The arguments plaintiffs have raised in the pending lawsuits tie back to
the questions of administrative discretion and how far administrative agencies can go in reinterpreting statutory purposes as they devise new rules for
implementing statutes. The injury is a procedural and democratic injury to
the American people stemming from administrative failure to respect the will
of the Congresses that passed the authorizing legislation defining the proper
purposes of Medicaid. Secondary harm occurs to state taxpayers, who suffer
from the state’s own unwillingness to acknowledge and grapple with expert
witnesses who predict harm from these policies. The tertiary harm affects
175. Riley Vetterkind, State Will Implement Medicaid Work Requirements Until Told Otherwise, WIS. ST. J. (Mar. 30, 2019), https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/state-willimplement-medicaid-work-requirements-until-told-otherwise/article_2201e541-9a8b-5626-8f0ef4f732bd0987.html; A Snapshot of State Proposals, supra note 165.
176. MANATT, P HELPS, & P HILLIPS, LLP, supra note 169, at 2.
177. MARY BETH MUSUMECI ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PROPOSED MEDICAID SECTION
1115 WAIVERS IN MAINE AND WISCONSIN (Aug. 2017), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-BriefProposed-Medicaid-Section-1115-Waivers-in-Maine-and-Wisconsin; Michael Shepherd, Mills Reverses LePage Push for Medicaid Work Requirements, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jan. 22, 2019, 6:13
PM), https://bangordailynews.com/2019/01/22/politics/mills-reverses-lepage-push-for-medicaidwork-requirements/.
178. Harris Meyer, CMS Approves Arizona’s Tough Medicaid Work Requirement, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (Jan. 18, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20190118/NEWS/190119901/cms-approves-arizona-s-tough-medicaid-work-requirement.
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the plaintiffs themselves who have lost access to their benefits, but their injury is contingent upon the idea of administrative wrongdoing. One gets the
sense in reading the complaints and opinions that if Congress were to pass
legislation declaring that shifting people from welfare to work was part of
Medicaid’s core purpose, the challenges to work requirements, no matter how
strict or how they were designed for implementation, would evaporate.
The story of Medicaid work requirements, however, ties in with other
implementation efforts relying on automated systems. Putting work requirements in this context raises a different set of questions about how entitlement
to government benefits should work and, to put it in simple terms, the amount
of aggravation, delay, frustration, and error we can rightfully expect people
to endure to gain access to statutorily granted benefits. Herein lurks an interesting equality problem, one that pushes us to question more deeply how
democratic checks can function in an increasingly automated world. It also
presses us to look more closely at the relationship between equality and intent. We need to think more comprehensively about how disparities function
and the extent to which reliance on automated systems shunts off claims of
wrongs or injury into a corral of mere inconvenience.
Such thinking, while not systematic, is already happening among some
officials. Michigan Governor, Democrat Gretchen Whitmer, was inaugurated after CMS had approved a section 1115 waiver for Michigan to implement a work requirement program. In her formal letter acknowledging the
waiver and the responsibilities it imposed, she cited Arkansas’s experience
of mass coverage losses and noted “Michigan’s statute is more sweeping than
Arkansas’s waiver, threatening a broader range of adults with more exacting
reporting demands.” 179 She declared her intent to work with the legislature
to adjust the program to improve its ability to “preserve coverage, promote
work, and reduce red tape for Michiganders, while also minimizing administrative cost to the state.” 180 While she did not go so far as to point the finger
at automation itself as a problem, she recognized the damage strict reporting
requirements and automated terminations can cause in an environment in
which some of the most precariously poised individuals in a state are thus
burdened and surveilled.
Is automation actually a new problem? Professor Virginia Eubanks argues—and I mostly agree with her—that it is not. 181 Rather, it provides a
new means of continuing long-established practices of distinguishing between the deserving and undeserving poor in ways that often result in racially
disparate outcomes. While algorithms themselves operate in a supposedly
179. Letter from Gretchen Whitmer, Governor of Mich., to Seema Verma, Adm’r., Ctrs. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/whitmer/Letter_from_Gov._Whitmer_to_CMS__645767_7.pdf.
180. Id.
181. See EUBANKS, supra note 4.
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arm’s-length fashion, they cannot remove human judgment and human bias.
They merely conceal it. As Professors Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale
note, “Because human beings program predictive algorithms, their biases and
values are embedded into the software’s instructions . . . . Scoring systems
mine datasets containing inaccurate and biased information provided by people.” 182
Automation does, however, raise some significant new issues, particularly with regard to vulnerable populations, which the experience of Medicaid work requirements illustrates well. And as Professor Eubanks notes,
even if a basic sense of justice and fairness do not move policymakers to
recognize these issues with respect to the management and surveillance of
the poor, self-interest should come into play at some point. 183 It may become
difficult to draw bright lines around the kinds of problems that are increasingly becoming routine for the poor, as anyone who has been through a struggle over automated denials of health insurance claims can readily attest.
It’s tempting to look at automated systems like the work reporting system implemented in Arkansas and pinpoint the problem as one of faulty technology. But even if the system itself had been designed to be more user
friendly, had not experienced glitches, and had been highly accessible to its
users, it raises serious concerns about how we as a society understand and
manage access to health care for the poor. The eager embrace of these systems underlines the collapse of the logic that drove the Supreme Court’s demand for procedural fairness in Goldberg v. Kelly, presses the idea of access
to health care as a benefit to be obtained in exchange for work, removes identifiable agents from the entire process of creating injuries, and reframes the
beneficiaries of state-funded health insurance as the taxpayers who (very
loosely) subsidize it, rather than the actual recipients. 184
Goldberg v. Kelly addressed welfare, not health insurance benefits, but
the 1970 ruling brought the Supreme Court close to understanding public
benefits as a form of property. Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court ruled
that prior to terminating public assistance benefits, states were obligated to
provide evidentiary hearings to recipients. 185 Because the benefits were a
statutory entitlement, the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural due process
required more than a cursory examination before benefits were withdrawn.
The Court emphasized that form as well as function mattered. 186 Denying
that written appeals were sufficient, the Court explained:

182. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014).
183. EUBANKS, supra note 4.
184. 397 U.S. 254, 255 (1970).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 266–67.
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Written submissions are an unrealistic option for most recipients,
who lack the educational attainment necessary to write effectively
and who cannot obtain professional assistance. Moreover, written
submissions do not afford the flexibility of oral presentations; they
do not permit the recipient to mold his argument to the issues the
decision maker appears to regard as important. Particularly where
credibility and veracity are at issue, as they must be in many termination proceedings, written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision. 187
The opinion further emphasized the need for confrontation and crossexamination of adverse witnesses as hallmarks of due process. 188 In its reasoning, the Court was clear that terminations without review or consideration
constituted wrongful behavior rising to the level of a legal injury for which
the state had to proffer a means of redress.
Fundamentally, the Court posited that some kind of deliberative consideration was needed. Individuals receiving public benefits were to be given
the opportunity to discuss face-to-face the human circumstances of their case,
to question and persuade, and to inject their individual perspectives into the
machinery of consideration and denial. 189 Scholars, most notably Professor
Lucie White, have shown that the deliberative vision articulated in the
Court’s opinion did not materialize from the ruling. 190 Nonetheless, public
benefit recipients learned to work within the system, often with the help of
sympathetic caseworkers who could reformulate their messy narratives into
claims that circumvented or short-circuited problematic results. 191
Goldberg v. Kelly, as applied to welfare, was undercut when Congress
transformed the AFDC program to TANF, diminishing the limited propertylike aspects of benefits by making them temporally limited and more contingent on work or other “productive” activities, but a sense remained that recipients of public benefits had some vested interest in what they were receiving. 192 Even under TANF, individual caseworkers handled cases and
managed their administration, functioning to a limited extent as street-level
bureaucrats, for all the good and ill that this model brings. With regard to
Medicaid, another major government benefit program for the poor, two
forces have converged—the more general push toward modernization, including automation, and the move toward work requirements.
187. Id. at 269.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 267–70.
190. Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the
Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 3 n.6 (1990); see also Julie A. Nice, Forty Years of Welfare
Policy Experimentation: No Acres, No Mule, No Politics, No Rights, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. P OL’Y 1
(2009).
191. White, supra note 190.
192. See Nice, supra note 190, at 1–2.

174

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:145

Modernization, as Professor Eubanks and other scholars note, has taken
place generally in benefits administration. The targets for automation include
“eligibility determination and case management systems; Web-based systems for submitting applications, reporting changes, and finding case status
and notices; call centers . . . for reporting changes, giving case status information, and conducting eligibility interviews; digitized document imaging;
and business process reengineering.” 193 Part of this transformation includes
moving from a case worker-centered model “toward a model in which workers perform designated functions.” 194 And the ACA specifically encouraged
automation: “Enhanced federal funding (i.e., 90 percent) is available for state
Medicaid information technology (IT) upgrades to accomplish the streamlining and data sharing requirements.” 195
The new solicitation for work requirement programs has enhanced emphasis on monitoring and reporting through electronic systems. On March
14, 2019, CMS released new guidance to states employing section 1115
demonstration programs mandating “regular reporting on key monitoring
metrics upon implementation” and requiring states to “partner[] with an independent evaluator.” 196 While the precise variables and collection methods
are not specified, the reporting requirements create greater incentives for automating data collection and reporting and measure success based on the
state’s own descriptions of its objectives. As a blog post anticipating this
development explained, states running programs were encouraged to think
about data availability and quality in their program designs: “Where will the
data to perform the evaluation come from? Does the data structure allow for
the analyses proposed in the evaluation?” 197 These new reporting protocols
do not contemplate requiring any direct connection to the central objective of
providing access to health coverage.
Lost in this push for automation and data collection is recognition of the
problems, both in the initial implementation and in the long run. With respect

193. Gina Mannix et al., How to Protect Clients Receiving Public Benefits When Modernized
Systems Fail: Apply Traditional Due Process in New Contexts, CLEARINGHOUSE ARTICLE, Jan.
2016, at 1, https://nclej.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ClearinghouseCommunity_MannixetalPublished-Article-with-Copyright.pdf.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1 n.2.
196. Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., CMS Strengthens Monitoring and
Evaluation Expectations for Medicaid 1115 Demonstrations (Mar. 14, 2019),
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cms-strengthens-monitoring-and-evaluation-expectations-medicaid-1115-demonstrations.
197. Kristin Allen, CMS Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration Evaluation Requirements: Implications for Designing Consumerism & Personal Responsibility Waivers, HEALTH MGMT.
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to implementation, chaos and failure have quickly become expected outcomes in shifts to automated systems. The states proposing and adopting
work requirements know that Medicaid recipients will struggle with reporting under the new systems. They know, or should know, that the systems
will fail. 198 They recognize that individuals grappling to implement and work
with the systems will struggle and fail to make them produce appropriate
outcomes. Judge Boasberg’s rulings take seriously the claim that demonstration programs did not consider the potential for large numbers of recipients
to lose access to coverage. He nonetheless frames this problem simply as
one of administrative mismatch with the purposes of Medicaid.
Further, both the states proposing these programs and CMS officials
know that once fully implemented and running as intended, the systems will
make discretion almost impossible to exercise. Adoption of automation
serves many purposes, including improving efficiency, linking information,
and preventing fraud, and these purposes play major roles in the wave of new
waiver approvals. But in serving these purposes, automation transforms the
programs themselves and the broader interests they supposedly serve. Systems designed for fraud prevention, cost savings, and the removal of human
judgment prioritize these interests to the point that they overshadow the Medicaid program’s aim to provide assistance to meet health care costs. Indeed,
as noted in Table 2, the systems are designed to lock people out for a variety
of periods ranging from months to a lifetime, based simply on the automated
determination of prior eligibility and access and failure to report the required
number of work hours for the designated period.
The problem thus runs deeper than criticizing the unwieldy nature of the
systems themselves, the mistakes they make, or the difficulty that the target
population has in using them, because these outcomes have no identifiable
agents-as-wrongdoers other than the enrollees. The problem then becomes
the enrollees themselves. Efforts, as witnessed by policy changes and litigation, focus on “fixing” the enrollees by doing more outreach, trying to educate them better about their responsibilities, and, albeit apathetically, providing more assistance to them in navigating the digital terrain. Still, when
resources are not forthcoming, the diagnosis comes down to their failure to
meet the requirements, even if empathetic state agents recognize how difficult or impossible it is for them to do so.
Because automation removes agency, it becomes much harder to identify injuries and wrongs to enrollees in legally cognizable terms. In Indiana’s
failed experiment with automation, after a lengthy and ugly court battle over
whether the State or IBM was responsible for failure, Indiana’s Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling holding IBM responsible to the tune of

198. See Philbrick v. Azar, Civ. No. 19-773 (JEB), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125675, at * 22–29
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$78 million. One of the attorneys representing the State, however, characterized the win as “a significant victory for Hoosier taxpayers.” 199 This comment, which echoed the trial judge’s lament situating Indiana taxpayers as
the victims of the automation failure, underlines the invisibility of enrollees
as individuals with rights that have been violated.
There is no simple answer—automation is ubiquitous and will not be
abandoned. We should, however, move away from understandings of legal
wrongs that require identifying individual malfeasors who intend to do harm,
or at least have been negligent, in these kinds of situations. It may be difficult
to point an accusatory finger at an algorithm, but an automated denial of benefits or a complicated digital system’s blocking access to health care can lead
to bad outcomes that should be understood as legal injuries. Scholars, policymakers, and the public need to reformulate our thinking to develop frameworks moving to blaming and ultimately claiming state responsibility. The
first step, though, is to stop ignoring the real and consequential injuries that
Medicaid work requirements are creating. The harm is not just the damage
produced to institutions like Medicaid by an administration eager to undo the
will of Congress by approving policies that undermine legislation. It is more
urgently to enrollees who find themselves held accountable for the algorithmic damages that cheapen and threaten their very lives.

199. Associated Press, Appeals Court Affirms Ruling that IBM Owes Indiana $78 Million,
INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J. (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.ibj.com/articles/70690-appeals-court-affirmsruling-that-ibm-owes-indiana-78-million.

